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Over the past seventy-five years, most humanitarian interven- 
tions have led to the removal of central governments and other au- 
thority structures, which in turn has destabilized individual countries 
as well as regions of the world. Although humanitarian intervention 
is still needed in today’s world, the international community must 
determine the most likely outcome of abruptly removing central 
governments and other authority structures before taking unilateral 
or collective military action under the doctrine of humanitarian in- 
tervention, even when taking such action is to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against hu- 
manity. 
Idealistically, humanitarian interventions end atrocities and es- 
tablish peace and prosperity; realistically, however, humanitarian 
interventions are extraordinary actions by States that are inherently 
destabilizing regardless of the intervenor’s altruistic intent. The 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention seeks to prevent humanitarian 
tragedies.1 Yet, perhaps a State that intervenes in another’s internal 
affairs cannot simultaneously safeguard citizens facing genocide 
and avoid engaging in active military conflict. Thus, military action 
under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is not merely a hu- 
manitarian cause but rather a highly explosive affair that can cripple 
a country’s infrastructure and have global ramifications. For in- 
stance, the military operations portrayed as a humanitarian interven- 






1 Arman Sarvarian, Humanitarian Intervention After Syria, 36 LEGAL STUD. 
20, 22 (2016). 
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in a country that, before the intervention, ranked among the most 
productive GDP countries in Africa.2 
The legality and ethical legitimacy of past humanitarian inter- 
ventions by States have been evaluated under various analytical 
frameworks by jurists, such as Ved P. Nanda, whose research the 
authors expanded upon in earlier articles examining the legitimacy 
under customary international law of the humanitarian interventions 
in Libya3 and Kosovo.4 The consequences of the multi-state NATO- 
led military intervention in Libya in 2011, and the American-led in- 
tervention in the Syrian Civil War in 2014, strongly militate in favor 
of the argument that the Potential for Destabilization (P4D) should 
be the threshold criterion that States must satisfy before engaging in 
any further deliberations about unilateral or collective military ac- 
tion under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to protect pop- 
ulations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity. This is especially so when the ultimate result of 
an intervention may be the removal of the central government and 
other authority structures. 
Reexamining the criteria by which States establish a case for hu- 
manitarian intervention under customary international law is appro- 
priate now, a time when the possibility of military intervention in 
Latin American countries has simmered in newsfeeds for the past 
year.5 Talks between the U.S. and other Latin American countries 
 
 
2 Cruz A. Echevarría & Javier García-Enríquez, The Economic Conse- 
quences of the Libyan Spring: A Synthetic Control Analysis, 30 DEF. & PEACE 
ECON. 592, 593 (2019). 
3 See generally Richard A.C. Alton & Jason Reed Struble, The Constitution- 
ality and Advancement of International Humanitarian Ideals in Libya by NATO 
and United States’ Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector, 23 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L 1, 9 (2014). 
4 See generally Jason Reed Struble & Richard A.C. Alton, The Legacy of 
Operation Allied Force: A Reflection on its Legality Under United States and In- 
ternational Law, 20 MICH ST. INT’L L. REV. 293, 300 (2013). 
5 See generally Carrie Kahn & Alex Leff, Trump’s Venezuela Moves Follow 
Long History of Intervention in Latin America, NPR (February 22, 2019, 1:35 
PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/22/696057482/trumps-venezuela-moves-fol- 
low-long-history-of-intervention-in-latin-america; Patrick Leet, Washington 
Doubles Down on its Military Intervention Script in Venezuela, NACLA (May 
31, 2019), https://nacla.org/news/2019/06/01/washington-doubles-down-its-mili- 
tary-intervention-script-venezuela; Frank O. Mora, What a Military Intervention 
in Venezuela Would Look Like, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (March 19, 2019), 
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have been conducted.6 And, after a failed coup, the Venezuelan op- 
position leader, Juan Guaidó, intimated a desire for U.S. military 
intervention.7 Furthermore, former National Security Advisor John 
Bolton made hints at military intervention against not only Vene- 
zuela, but also Cuba and Nicaragua.8 In light of the current political 
and humanitarian crises in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela giving 
rise to calls for action by the international community, it is time to 
revisit the criteria by which States establish a case for humanitarian 
intervention under customary international law. 
In making a case for P4D to be the threshold criterion that States 
must satisfy before engaging in any further deliberations about uni- 
lateral or collective military action in the name of humanitarian in- 
tervention to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity, the works of international 
law jurists, historians, scholars on international relations, moral eth- 
icists, and operational professionals are surveyed. Part II traces the 
development of P4D born out of the authors’ prior research on past 
humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and Libya. Part III briefly ex- 
plores definitions of customary international law and humanitarian 
intervention. Part IV surveys theories from the fields of economics, 
ethics, and change management, specifically the moral hazard, just 
war, and the transition model, to further develop P4D. Part V ex- 
amines alternatives of P4D, such as the treaty-based criteria the Re- 
sponsibility to Protect (R2P) and Responsibility while Protecting 
(RWP). Part VI concludes that P4D ought to be the first considera- 
tion by States before taking unilateral or collective military action 






6 Andres Oppenheimer, A U.S. military intervention in Venezuela is not com- 
pletely unthinkable anymore amid Trump’s rhetoric, MIAMI HERALD (May 3, 
2019, 5:06 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns- 
blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article229989249.html. 
7 Venezuela crisis: Guaidó ‘considering asking US for military interven- 
tion’, BBC (May 5, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america- 
48172520. 
8 Matt Withers, John Bolton and the Monroe Doctrine, THE ECONOMIST 
(May 9, 2019), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/05/11/john-bolton-and- 
the-monroe-doctrine. 
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applied to potential interventions in Latin America to study P4D’s 
utility in the current international climate. 
 
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF THE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN 
KOSOVO AND LIBYA 
To lay the foundation for the authors’ contentions that follow, it 
is necessary to explore the authors’ prior examination of past hu- 
manitarian interventions in Kosovo and Libya. The authors’ exam- 
inations entailed the application of qualifying criteria developed by 
international jurist Ved P. Nanda. Nanda’s criteria stood out to the 
authors not only for its international recognition but also for its use- 
fulness. The authors’ prior examination of the lead-up to each of the 
military interventions in the former Yugoslavia and in Libya, which 
were ostensibly taken to avert deepening humanitarian crises, gave 
birth to P4D. As such, exploring the authors’ retrospective conclu- 
sions about the military interventions in Kosovo and Libya is key 
for the establishment of P4D. A review of Nanda’s criteria is first 
looked upon as applied to Kosovo. This is then followed by the 
authors adding to Nanda’s criteria in their examination of the inter- 
vention that occurred in Libya. 
 
A. Kosovo 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was based on a 
claim of humanitarian intervention;9 as such, it had altruistic aims to 
prevent the suffering of innocent civilians. The authors employed 
five criteria developed by Ved P. Nanda—(1) necessity, (2) propor- 
tionality, (3) purpose, (4) nature of the actors, and (5) maximization 
of the best outcomes10—to examine the legitimacy under customary 
 
 
9 Struble & Alton, supra note 4, at 313-25. 
10 Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia and 
Haiti—Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International 
Law—Part I, 20 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 305, 330 (1992) [hereinafter Nanda 
Part I]; Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Li- 
beria—Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International 
Law—Part II, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 827, 827-28 (1998) [hereinafter 
Nanda Part II]; see also Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International 
Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. 
Charter, 4 CAL W. INT’L L.J. 203, 1974, at 258-67 (employing a three-prong 
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international law of the humanitarian intervention by NATO in Ko- 
sovo. Nanda’s five criteria were applied retrospectively because 
they provided a balanced analytical framework to examine whether 
such a humanitarian intervention was warranted in the first place. 
The authors posited that if a majority of the five criteria were satis- 
fied, then (arguably) NATO’s bombing of Kosovo was legally jus- 
tified under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The authors 
determined that NATO’s operation in Kosovo could not be legally 
justified under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.11 
This determination that the intervention was not legally justifia- 
ble was based upon the failure of key elements of Nanda’s five cri- 
teria. The NATO operation in Kosovo was unnecessary because 
there were no widespread incidents of gross, persistent, and system- 
atic violations of basic human rights in Kosovo before NATO’s op- 
eration and bombing campaign.12 Before March of 1999, the month 
that the ethnic Albanian delegation signed the peace plan but the 
Serbian representatives rejected it,13 “the numbers of Kosovo-Alba- 
nians killed, raped or expelled up to this point were low       ”14 Af- 
ter rejecting the peace plan, Serbian military and police forces 
ramped up the intensity of their operations against ethnic Albanians 
in Kosovo.15 Furthermore, the aggression used by NATO was dis- 







analysis of the substantive, procedural and preferential criteria of humanitarian 
intervention under customary international law). 
11 Struble & Alton, supra note 4, at 325. 
12   Id. at 318 (citing AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. ET AL., 
POLITICAL KILLINGS IN KOSOVA/KOSOVO, MARCH-JUNE 1999: A COOPERATIVE 
REPORT BY THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE OF THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE SCIENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM 
OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE 11 (2000)); 
NATO Strikes Over Kosovo Continue to Divide, 10 Years On, DEUTSCHE WELLE 
(Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4121076,00.html. 
13 STEVEN WOEHREL & JULIE KIM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31053, KOSOVO 
AND U.S. POLICY 3 (2006). 
14 MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 101 (2005). 
15 NATO and Kosovo: Historical Overview, NATO, http://www.nato.int/ko- 
sovo/history.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2019). 
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the killing of innocent Kosovars seriously undermined any altruistic 
justification for military intervention.16 
The NATO operation failed to meet its purpose, which was pur- 
portedly set between U.S. national security interests and humanitar- 
ian concerns.17 In May of 1998, the North Atlantic Council set forth 
NATO’s two main objectives for the conflict in Kosovo: (1) to help 
to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis by contributing to the 
response of the international community; and (2) to promote stabil- 
ity and security in neighboring countries with particular emphasis 
on Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.18 In 
June of 1998, President Clinton issued an Executive Order that de- 
clared a “national emergency” to deal with the threat of regional de- 
stabilization posed by the conflict in Kosovo19 and NATO began to 
consider military options.20 NATO’s core objectives of the air- 
strikes that followed were “[t]o prevent more human suffering, more 
repression, more violence against the civilian population of Ko- 
sovo.”21 In September of 1998, the United Nations (U.N.) Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1199,22 which called for a cease-fire 
and expressed deep concern about the excessive use of force by Ser- 
bian security forces and the Yugoslav army.23 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force in Kosovo failed the nature of 
the actors’ criterion. Despite NATO being comprised of several na- 
tions, NATO was the sole actor. NATO lacked a mandate from the 
U.N. Security Council, diminishing the need to address whether it 
was “collective or unilateral.”24 
 
16 Struble & Alton, supra note 4, at 320 (citing Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, 
World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 847, 856 
(1999)). 
17 Id. at 321. 
18 NATO, supra note 15. 
19 Exec. Order No. 13,088, 63 Fed. Reg. 32109 (June 9, 1998). 
20 See generally id. 
21 Ved P. Nanda, NATO’s Armed Intervention in Kosovo and International 
Law, 10 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 1, 8 (2000) (citing Press Release, NATO, Press 
Statement – by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, (Mar. 23, 1999)). 
22 S.C. Res. 1199 (Sept. 23, 1998). 
23 Id. 
24 Nanda Part II, supra note 10, at 827; See also Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 
266-67 (stating that “collective operations should be preferred over individual 
measures. While it is true that intervention does not gain in legality by being col- 
lective rather than individual, there is nevertheless a presumption that collective 
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Lastly, the NATO operation failed to maximize the best outcome 
because it effectively precluded any joint proceedings in attempts at 
negotiating a settlement between Kosovo and Serbia, therefore leav- 
ing the only option as a unilateral declaration of independence by 
Kosovo.25 
B. Libya 
After NATO’s Operation Allied Force, the authors continued to 
examine other humanitarian interventions, such as the two NATO 
and U.S.-backed military actions in Libya named Operation Odys- 
sey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector. As with Operation Al- 
lied Force in Kosovo, NATO’s Operation Odyssey Dawn and Op- 
eration Unified Protector were couched in terms of humanitarian in- 
tervention. Operation Odyssey Dawn aimed to end the humanitarian 
crisis and stop the killing of civilians.26 
In examining the legitimacy of NATO’s humanitarian interven- 
tion in Libya, the authors again applied Nanda’s five criteria while 
developing an additional criterion to address the destabilizing nature 
of humanitarian interventions.27 Thus, the criteria used were: (1) 
necessity, (2) proportionality, (3) purpose, (4) nature of the actors, 
(5) maximization of the best outcomes, and (6) P4D.28 As with Ko- 
sovo, the authors concluded that the military action could not be jus- 
tified under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention because 
Nanda’s five criteria in addition to the P4D criterion were not satis- 
fied. 
Briefly, as to each criterion, and delving into necessity first, it 
became unclear whether NATO and the U.S., as sanctioned by the 
U.N., were intervening in a civil war or genocide, thus calling into 
question the necessity of the joint operations.29 Concerning pur- 
pose, as the NATO airstrikes progressed it became clear that their 
aim was targeting Gaddafi and his fellow authority figures,30 which 
called into question the Operations’ ostensible purpose of protecting 
 
action is more likely to ensure the relative purity of the intentions required from 
the intervenors.”). 
25 Struble & Alton, supra note 4, at 325. 
26 Alton & Struble, supra note 3, at 25-26. 
27 Id. at 21. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 22-23. 
30 Id. 
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civilians from violence. Moreover, if the goal of airstrikes were to 
protect civilians, then the targeting of authority structures would 
raise questions about the proportionality and purpose of the joint 
Operations.31 Regarding the nature of the actors, there was a collec- 
tive response with the U.N. noting calls from the United Arab 
League.32 However, questions soon began to circulate about whether 
NATO was simply serving as the military arm for the U.N. Security 
Council, in contravention of NATO’s role.33 The joint operations 
failed to maximize the best outcome. NATO coalition forces 
launched Operation Odyssey Dawn on March 19, 2011.34 By 2014, 
the date of the authors’ Libya publication, it was evident that Oper- 
ation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector each failed to 
maximize the best outcome.35 That determination remains true to- 
day. 
U.S. and NATO operations quickly ended after the death of Gad- 
dafi.36 With the strongman Gaddafi gone and elimination of virtu- 
ally all other authority structures, a civil war erupted in Libya,37 or 
it quickly expanded at the very least if prior assessments concluding 
that the country was already embroiled in a civil war are taken at 
face value. After the fall of the regime, there was an uptick in vio- 
lence directed at international parties in the region, such as the U.S., 
United Kingdom, and Italian diplomats, and members of the Red 
Cross.38 There also was an outflux of weapons and fighters from 
Libya to neighboring countries, such as Mali, Niger, and Syria,39 as 
well as a brewing refugee crisis in Libya.40 Libyan officials 
 
31 Id. at 23-26. 
32 See generally S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
33 Alton & Struble, supra note 3, at 27. 
34 Jeremiah Gertler, Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Is- 
sues for Congress, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (Mar. 30, 2011), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41725.pdf. 
35 Alton and Struble, supra note 3, at 27-33. 
36 UN Security Council votes to end Libya operations, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 
2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15481143. 
37 Jonathan M. Winer, Origins of the Libyan Conflict and Options for its Res- 
olution, MIDDLE EAST INST., (Feb. 2019), https://www.mei.edu/sites/de- 
fault/files/201903/Origins_of_the_Libyan_Conflict_and_Options_for_its_Reso- 
lution.PDF (policy paper 2019-4). 
38 Id. at 28. 
39 Id. at 28-32. 
40 Id. at 32-3. 
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confirmed the movement of weapons into Syria.41 And Taureg mi- 
litias, which had been fighting for Gaddafi, returned to Mali to fight 
for control of their home country.42 Malian President, Amadou Tou- 
mani Touré, was unable to deal effectively with this onslaught of 
fighters returning home and was ousted by the military that he had 
controlled.43 Removing President Touré destabilized an otherwise 
generally healthy administration, which up to that point had a bud- 
ding relationship with the U.S. 
Towards the end of 2018, the U.N.-backed GNA was forced to 
call a state of emergency in the capital.44 The LNA leader, General 
Khalifa Haftar, portrayed his struggle as necessary to end the may- 
hem caused by warring militias45 as he advanced on the capital, call- 
ing for further U.S. intervention.46 Human Rights Watch best sum- 
marized the situation: 
Unaccountable militias—some linked to the interior 
and defense ministries of the United Nations-backed 
Government of National Accord (GNA), and others 
linked to the Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated 
with the rival Interim Government—continued to 
clash with each other in various parts of the country, 
 
41 Id. at 31-2 (citing C.J. Chivers, Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, In Turna- 
bout, Syria Rebels Get Libyan Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/world/africa/in-a-turnabout-syria-rebels- 
get-libyan-weapons.html?pagewanted=all). 
42 Id. at 31. 
43 Id. 
44 Civil War in Libya, Council on Foreign Relations (May 29, 2019), 
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya. 
45 David D. Kirkpatrick, Libyan Forces Fighting for the Capital Disavow Ex- 
tremists, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.ny- 
times.com/2019/04/13/world/africa/libya-tripoli-khalifa-hifter.html (“A former 
officer in Muammar el-Qaddafi’s army, General Haftar broke with the dictator in 
the 1980s and received C.I.A. support before fleeing to Virginia, where he lived 
for two decades. He returned to Libya shortly before the NATO intervention in 
2011 hoping to lead the revolution against Colonel Qaddafi. Sidelined by the re- 
bels, he re-emerged in 2014, waging a battle against Islamists in the eastern city 
of Benghazi. After years of fighting, he gained control over eastern Libya. Then 
he set his sights on Tripoli.”); Frederic Wehrey and Jeffrey Feltman, Libya Is En- 
tering Another Civil War. America Can Stop It., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/opinion/libya-civil-war-.html. 
46 Wehrey and Feltman, supra note 45. 
2020] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 35 
 
 
as efforts to reconcile main parties in the east and 
west failed. In Libya’s south, Tebu, Tuareg, and Arab 
armed groups continued to clash for control of terri- 
tory and resources.47 
As of May 2019, the Council on Foreign Relations noted there 
were approximately 60,000 refugees and another nearly 200,000 in- 
ternally displaced persons as a result of the Libyan civil war, which 
has engrossed the country since the downfall of Gaddafi.48 
As recently as May 2020, Libya remains chaotic and ungovern- 
able.49 James Roscoe, in his speech to the U.N., noted concern over 
Russia’s new involvement in the country. Specifically, the concerns 
include, “the recent transfer of Russian aircraft from Syria to 
Libya’s putschist Gen. Khalifa Haftar to aid him in his campaign 
against the U.N.-recognized government.”50 All of this confirms 
Libya remains destabilized, causing further issues for the Arab re- 
gion as a whole. This also comes at a time with escalating human 
rights concerns against Kurds in Syria from Turkish invasions and 
Syria potentially becoming a Russian protectorate, all while Israeli 
forces go after Iranian-backed Syrian forces.51 This becomes im- 
portant as there may be a traceable impact from the U.S. and NATO 
 
 
47 Libya, Events 2018, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/libya. 
48 Civil War in Libya, supra note 44. 
49 Mustafa Fetouri, Why is Libya so chaotic and ungovernable?, MIDDLE 
EAST MONITOR (May 21, 2020), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200521- 
why-is-libya-so-chaotic-and-ungovernable/. 
50 US, UK concerned over growing evidence of Russian involvement in Libya, 
DAILY SABAH (May 31, 2020), https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/us-uk-con- 
cerned-over-growing-evidence-of-russian-involvement-in-libya/news. 
51 Khairallah Khairallah, The new rules of the game in Syria, THE ARAB 
WEEKLY (Jan. 06, 2020), https://thearabweekly.com/new-rules-game-syria; Re- 
port: Russia building new military base in northeast Syria, AL-MONITOR (May 
28, 2020), https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/russia-new-mili- 
tary-base-northeast-syria.html; Amberin Zaman, Turkey’s assault against Syrian 
Kurds leaves trail of misery and spin, AL-MONITOR (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/turkey-incursion-syria-ref- 
ugees-burn-victims-accusations.html; Israeli aircraft reportedly pound military 
outposts in Syria, AL JAZEERA (May 5, 2020), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/syria-israeli-jets-hit-military-outposts- 
aleppo-province-200505022122693.htmls 
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Operations in Libya destabilizing the region and spilling over into 
Syria. 
 
III. WORKABLE DEFINITIONS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The serious issues that continue after U.S. and NATO military 
operations call into question the basis of humanitarian intervention 
in modern practice, or at least those interventions under the guise of 
that claim. Before exploring P4D as a standalone threshold criterion, 
we must first visit upon workable definitions of customary interna- 
tional law and humanitarian intervention. 
 
A. Defining Customary International Law: Durin’s Bane 
To understand the doctrine of humanitarian intervention one 
must first understand its relationship to customary international law. 
Customary international law is one component of international law, 
the other is treaties.52 The doctrine of humanitarian intervention re- 
mains within the realm of customary international law despite ef- 
forts to bring it within the purview of the U.N. Charter.53 Indeed, the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention was born out of custom and 
remains solely in the domain of customary international law.54 
One of the main issues with the current state of customary inter- 
national law is that it is enveloped in “deep legal theory and ideol- 




52 See generally Alexei Paish, The Useful and Necessary Distinction Between 
Customary International Law and Treaties, MCCARTHY TETRAULT (Oct. 11, 
2016), https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/vestra-vox/useful-and-neces- 
sary-distinction-between-customary-international-law-and-treaties. 
53 Sir Daniel Bethlehem KCMG QC, Stepping Back a Moment – The Legal 
Basis in Favour of a Principle of Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL: TALK! (Sep. 
12, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in- 
favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention/. 
54 See Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects, DANISH 
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1999), https://www.diis.dk/files/me- 
dia/publications/import/extra/humanitarian_intervention_1999.pdf. 
55   INT’L LAW ASSOC., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE 
FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000) [hereinafter 
ILA], 2, 
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rooted in legal theory, because it is based on custom.56 Conse- 
quently, defining customary international law and the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention is an exercise that can be likened to 
Durin’s Bane,57 where jurists and academics end up digging too 
deep into legal theory, eventually unraveling the concept they at- 
tempted to articulate in the first place. 
There is no universally accepted, formal definition of customary 
international law.58 “Customary . . . practice of states followed . . . 
from a sense of legal obligation,” is the definition of customary in- 
ternational law codified in the treatise, Restatement of the Law 
(Third) The Foreign Relations Law of the United States.59 The six- 
teen-year long committee project undertaken by the preeminent In- 
ternational Law Association (ILA) issued a comprehensive report 
(ILA Report) on the formation of general customary international 
law60 that defined general customary international law as: 
[A] rule of customary international law is one which 
is created and sustained by the constant and uniform 
practice of States and other subjects of international 
law in or impinging upon their international legal re- 
lations, in circumstances which give rise to a legiti- 
mate expectation of similar conduct in the future . . . 
If a sufficiently extensive and representative number 
of States participate in such a practice in a consistent 
manner, the resulting rule is one of ‘general custom- 






57 J.R.R. Tolkien perhaps explains why some things should be left undis- 
turbed: “they delved too greedily and too deep, and disturbed that from which 
they fled, Durin’s Bane.” J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS 309 (Harper- 
Collins Publishers 2014). 
58 Richard A.C. Alton, An Examination of Historical Reconstruction’s Im- 
pact on Modern Customary International Law via an Analysis of Medieval Post- 
Conflict Ransoming of Prisoners, 39 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 271, 272 
(2016). 
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
60   See generally ILA, supra note 55. 
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customary international law exists, for any particular 
State to be bound by that rule it is not necessary to 
prove either that State’s consent to it or its belief in 
the rule’s obligatory or (as the case may be) permis- 
sive character.61 
B. Defining Humanitarian Intervention: Help, Rescue, Or Protect 
Humanitarian intervention is a highly controversial concept 
which has occasioned a deep split among legal publicists.62 Human- 
itarian intervention can be a legitimate and necessary remedy in cer- 
tain well-defined instances, such as terrorist hostage seizure inci- 
dents.63 But because there is no universally accepted, formal defini- 
tion of humanitarian intervention, defining humanitarian interven- 
tion is equally difficult. Fernando Tesón affirmatively states, “I de- 
fine humanitarian intervention as proportionate help, including for- 
cible help, provided by governments (individually or in alliances) to 
individuals in another state who are victims of severe tyranny (de- 
nial of human rights by their own government) or anarchy (denial of 
human rights by collapse of the social order).”64 Alan Kuperman 
finds humanitarian intervention, “encompasses any international ac- 
tion that is primarily motivated by the humanitarian desire to protect 
civilian targets of state violence.”65 In unpacking the meaning of hu- 
manitarian intervention, the Australian philosopher C.A.J. Coady 
finds the term “is now used to distinguish interventions that are 
aimed at rescuing foreign people from the harm that is being done, 
or is about to be done, to them by the state authorities who are re- 
sponsible for their protection.”66 
These definitions of humanitarian intervention, though formu- 
lated differently, do contain major elements that bind them together. 
 
61 Id. at 8. 
62 Robert A. Friedlander, Confusing Victims and Victimizers: Nicaragua and 
the Reinterpretation of International Law, 14 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 87, 90 
(1985). 
63 Id. 
64 Fernando R. Tesón, Ending Tyranny in Iraq, 19 ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS 1, 2 (2005). 
65 Alan J. Kuperman, The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Les- 
sons from the Balkans, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 49, 51-52 (2008). 
66 C.A.J. Coady, The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, 45 
PEACEWORKS 1, 11-12 (2002). 
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The terms rescuing, help, and protect intertwine these definitions 
and lend a cohesiveness. These three terms are also altruistic nota- 
tions. Coady goes so far as to note a better term of art for this type 
of intervention would be altruistic intervention.67 The base term hu- 
manitarian is meant as a differentiating signifier between other 
forms of interventions, such as those for conquest, or cases of self- 
defense or retaliation.68 As such, through the use of the various def- 
initions, a general sense of humanitarian intervention can be given 
as means of intervention used under the premise to help, rescue, or 
protect a population suffering, or about to suffer, gross human rights 
violations in the sovereign territory of another nation. 
A workable definition of humanitarian intervention allows for a 
foundational understanding of its place in international law. But 
with the focus on the notions of help, rescue, or protect coming to 
the fore, this also placed an added emphasis on the need to look 
closer at the human element of these types of intervention. Thus, 
moving away from the theoretical and into the practical—that is, the 
actual ground level where people are involved in these conflicts, 
whether it be victim, military, rebel, refugee, or central government. 
By incorporating additional fields of study into the topic, the authors 
conclude that the overall practical understanding of the implemen- 
tation and impact of humanitarian interventions could be markedly 
improved. 
 
IV. STRENGTHENING P4D WITH NON-LAW BASED REASONING: 
ECONOMICS, ETHICS & CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
The fields of economics, ethics, and change management each 
provide support for the elevation of P4D to that of a threshold crite- 
rion, as each field has theories that inform the definition and nature 
of humanitarian intervention. A general failure by some jurists to 
look beyond the field of international law when addressing the very 
complex and human-focused concept of humanitarian intervention 
led the authors to turn to theories developed in economics, ethics, 
 
 
67 Id. at 12. 
68 See id. at 11-12; see also Onder Bakircioglu, The Right to Self-Defence in 
National and International Law: The Role of the Imminence Requirement, 19 IND. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 9 (2009). 
40 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:25 
 
 
and change management to address the practical realities of human- 
itarian intervention. 
 
A. Moral Hazard Concept 
Countries that engage in military interventions in the name of 
humanitarianism should be aware of the moral hazard concept. The 
moral hazard concept aptly demonstrates the logical examination 
that P4D encourages before States engage in military intervention 
for humanitarian reasons. The moral hazard concept raises the issue 
of whether the act of intervention itself, especially in cases of fre- 
quent use, creates a destabilizing situation solely by the mere pro- 
spect of its potential use. Internal revolutionaries may take actions 
to further destabilize a country or region while believing their calls 
for help will be answered in time by the international community. 
Paradoxically, assisting frequently causes death to civilians69—the 
very thing that giving assistance was meant to stop. The moral haz- 
ard concept begs the question: what are the destabilizing factors of 
intervention? And that is its connection to P4D. 
As Kuperman relays, “[i]n economics, moral hazard is the phe- 
nomenon in which the provision of protection against risk (often by 
insurance) unintentionally promotes irresponsible or fraudulent 
risk-taking, and thereby perversely increases the likelihood of the 
undesired outcome.”70 Kuperman uses the moral hazard concept to 
discuss the implications of excessive use of humanitarian interven- 
tion. His premise, in its simplest term, is that with the increased use 
of humanitarian intervention, marginalized groups in a certain sov- 
ereign nation are more likely to act out in armed rebellion with the 
hope that outside military aid will be forthcoming.71 
Kuperman acknowledges, as his definition of humanitarian in- 
tervention indicates, that the intent is to protect vulnerable people 
against state-perpetrated genocide or ethnic cleansing.72 However, 
“by raising expectations of diplomatic and military intervention to 




69 Kuperman, supra note 65, at 49. 
70 Id. at 50. 
71 See generally id. at 51. 
72 Id. at 50. 
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unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and 
increasing its likelihood of success.”73 As Kuperman explains, 
In some cases, moral hazard promotes irresponsibil- 
ity: for example, a group’s leaders will acquire arms 
and secede from the state even though they know this 
may trigger state retaliation that they cannot defend 
against, because they expect the international com- 
munity either to deter such retaliation or intervene on 
their behalf in the event of violence. In other cases, 
moral hazard promotes outright fraud: for example, 
rebels will attack state officials deliberately intend- 
ing to provoke retaliation against their own group’s 
civilians, to attract international intervention that 
they deem necessary to attain their political goals. In 
practice, intervention does sometimes help rebels at- 
tain their goals, but usually it is too late or inadequate 
to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the emerg- 
ing norm causes some genocidal violence that other- 
wise would not occur.74 
One could argue that the moral hazard concept was tested in the 
Arab Spring, and more fundamentally in Libya and Syria following 
the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and the international responses 
to them.75 Kuperman published his work on the moral hazard con- 
cept in 2008—two years before the Arab Spring and three years be- 
fore Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya and the start of the Syrian 
conflict.76 His thoughts about the moral hazard concept and its effect 
 
73 Id. at 51. 
74 Id. 
75 See Alan J. Kuperman, A Model Humanitarian Intervention?, 38 INT’L 
SECURITY 105, 123 (2013) (“It is not yet known whether the expectation of inter- 
vention triggered the rebellion, because the main agitators have yet to write or tell 
their story. A few weeks into the uprising, however, the rebel leaders clearly 
viewed prospective NATO intervention as vital, in light of the government’s su- 
perior military resources.”). 
76 See Kuperman, supra note 65 at 49; Arab Spring, HISTORY, 
https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/arab-spring (last updated Jan. 17, 
2020); JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41725, OPERATION ODYSSEY 
DAWN (LIBYA): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2011); Lucy Rodgers, 
David Gritten, James Offer and Patrick Asare, Syria: The story of the conflict, 
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on military intervention seem to have been verified by events occur- 
ring in Libya post-publication.77 
In Libya, the international intervention was well documented 
and the intervention’s destabilizing after-effects well felt. In Syria, 
the world was presented with an underequipped revolution meeting 
first-hand with a well-equipped and nefarious government re- 
sponse,78 thus leading to one of the greatest humanitarian crises of 
the new millennium. The international assistance for the revolution- 
aries has proven inadequate to avert retaliation from the Syrian gov- 
ernment and the country has spent the better part of a decade killing 
itself from within. 
 
B. Ethical Considerations 
The inclusion of ethics facilitates a bigger picture discussion of 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in terms of the realities of 
war and military intervention, above and beyond the nuances of the 
doctrine. Bringing ethics into the discussion of humanitarian inter- 
vention allows for words such as paradox, paradigms, and morality 
to gain stronger significance in the legal understanding of humani- 
tarian intervention. Ethics reminds jurists of the paradox of using 
violence to quell violence, and the never-ending cycle that it creates. 
Calling a military intervention humanitarian does not make it any 
less violent. Not coming to terms with that means we are unable to 
effectuate the change we hope for: the end of tyranny and the end of 
gross human rights violations. Violence is destabilizing because it 
causes death and destruction, but the hope is that death and destruc- 
tion will be minimal compared to the advances made. Coady notes 
this specifically when discussing what gives the world or a region 
the best chance at stability and peace.79 Therefore, before any mili- 
tary intervention, the potential intervenors must clearly understand 
the potential for domestic or regional destabilization, which is 
 
BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east- 
26116868. 
77   E-mail from Alan J. Kuperman, Ph.D. to Richard A.C. Alton, Esq. (Jan. 
28, 2019) (affirming the idea that the moral hazard contributed to the perpetuation, 
if not the initiation, of the Libya intervention). 
78   See generally Lina Sinjab, Syria conflict: from peaceful protest to civil 
war, BBC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east- 
21797661. 
79 See C.A.J. Coady, supra note 66, at 24. 
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ethics’ connection to P4D, and that which moves it beyond Nanda’s 
criteria. 
Coady defines ethics as something that “should form a vital part 
of the body of knowledge we have and continue to seek about the 
most sensible and sustainable answers to the question ‘How should 
we live?’”80 In bringing ethics to the table, Coady utilizes Just War 
Theory.81 “The primary ethical machinery for considering whether 
aggressive war can be humanitarian must at least begin with the ‘just 
war tradition.’”82 As such, ethical considerations involve a much 
older historical context, well beyond the time frames typically ex- 
amined when assessing recent military actions taken in the name of 
humanitarian intervention.83 
As to our current undertaking in using ethics to better understand 
humanitarian intervention, Coady continues, “humanitarian inter- 
vention has to overcome the presumptive case against aggressive 
war and has to discharge the other requirements of just war the- 
ory.”84 Coady delivers this understanding by proffering moralistic 
ideas of good and evil, “[t]his includes attention to the immediate 
good likely to be achieved and evil averted by intervention set 
against any violation of rights to self-determination involved, and 
against the consequences for world stability and peace that may be 
in prospect further down the road.”85 As a tool, Coady asserts, 
“[e]thics is not only a matter of calculating consequences, but it does 
include the calculating of consequences and the weighing of differ- 
ent goods and evils, and just war theory reflects this in its require- 
ments, especially that of proportionality.”86 
In searching for a root cause, Coady finds, “[i]n addition, the 
attractions of decisive violence frequently tend to distract us from 
 
 
80   Id. at 13. 
81   Id. at 18. 
82 Id. 
83 See generally id. (noting that the root of modern-day humanitarian inter- 
vention should not be cut off by the normal customary international law Western- 
ized threshold of the Treaty of Westphalia, but there may exist earlier forms of 
such actions as Just War, and its similar counterparts in Muslim and Chinese ide- 
ologies, serves as the potentially verifiable historical root to modern-day human- 
itarian intervention). 
84 See C.A.J. Coady, supra note 68, at 24. 
85   Id. 
86   Id. 
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the more fundamental, though less glamorous, task of reconsidering 
and reconstructing our domestic and international politics so that our 
world will be a somewhat less dangerous and exploitative place for 
all its inhabitants.”87 Humanitarian intervention is undoubtedly, re- 
gardless of the negative or positive view of its necessity, painted in 
altruistic violence. Coady’s work asks us to acknowledge that para- 
dox and prepare ourselves for its consequence.88 However, as noted 
in Coady’s comment above, the world may be better suited in root- 
ing out the base cause of the need for intervention as opposed to 
adding further violence regardless if that violence is called humani- 
tarian. 
Coady posits “Can an ‘aggressive’ war be humanitarian?”89 As 
Coady notes, jurists seeking to differentiate war and humanitarian 
intervention are not seeing the forest for the trees, and “may be in- 
fluenced by the feeling, shared by many enthusiasts for humanitar- 
ian intervention, that it is really a form of policing rather than war.”90 
While Coady acknowledges that may be the case in some instances, 
the reality is “interventions require warriors rather than police, 
though police may be useful, if hard to come by, after an interven- 
tion.”91 However, Coady finds that this realization of the paradox of 
humanitarian intervention is in part recognized in international law: 
So the air of paradox is connected with the morally 
problematic nature of resort to war, and this explains, 
to a large degree, the strong bias in international law 
and the UN Charter against military intervention, 
which must be viewed in light of the revulsion 
against the horrors associated with the great aggres- 
sive wars of the twentieth century.92 
C. Transition Model 
Examining humanitarian intervention in the light of change 
management and the transition model helps decipher events that 
have occurred in the wake of such interventions. The transition 
 
87 Id. at 36. 
88 See id. at 17. 
89 Id. at 17-19. 
90 Id. at 17. 
91   Id. 
92   Id. 
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model allows for a micro examination of what humans need to cope 
with change and stresses the importance that any transition be natu- 
ral.93 Individuals need time to work through loss or change; they 
need a neutral zone to gain insight and build their new beginning. 
Having their new beginning thrust upon them whilst amid an ending 
has a destabilizing result upon the person. The same is true for a 
country going through a transition, having their new beginning 
forced upon them can have a deteriorating effect as can be seen play- 
ing out in Libya. Therein lies the transition model’s connection to 
P4D. 
The transition model is a tool used by professionals in change 
management.94 Change management is a professional discipline 
geared towards guiding organizations and the individuals that make 
up those organizations through dealing with how to prepare and suc- 
cessfully adopt change.95 The transition model was developed by 
change consultant William Bridges.96 Transition, according to 
Bridges, comes in three stages: (1) an ending, loss, or a letting go, 
(2) a neutral zone, and (3) a new beginning.97 
In discussing change generally, Bridges raises questions that 
speak also to countries undergoing regime change, regardless if that 
previous regime was villainous. “Why is letting go so difficult? This 
is a puzzling question, especially if we have been looking forward 
to change. It is frightening to discover that some part of us is still 
holding on to what we used to be, for it makes us wonder whether 
the change was a bad idea.”98 Bridges acknowledges, “that letting 
go is at best an ambiguous experience.”99 Transition, in this sense, 
is not solely moving from one point to the other; it is an experience 
 
93 Bridges’ Transition Model, WILLIAM BRIDGES ASSOC. TRANSITION 
MGMT. LEADERS, https://wmbridges.com/about/what-is-transition/ (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2020). 
94 Ben Janse, Bridges Transition Model, TOOLSHERO (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.toolshero.com/change-management/bridges-transition-model/. 
95 What is Change Management?, PROSCI INC., https://www.prosci.com/re- 
sources/articles/what-is-change-management (last visited Sept. 7, 2020). 
96   Bridges’ Transition Model, MIND TOOLS, 
https:www.mindtools.com/pages/article/bridges-transition-model.htm, (last vis- 
ited Sept. 7, 2020) [hereinafter Transition Model]. 
97 See generally WILLIAM BRIDGES, TRANSITIONS: MAKING SENSE OF LIFE’S 
CHANGES 4 (2d ed. 2004); see also Janse, supra note 94. 
98 BRIDGES, supra note 97, at 11. 
99 Id. at 13. 
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absorbed into the person who is transitioning. Both the loss and the 
transition leave vestiges of themselves in the individual. Individuals, 
Bridges finds, naturally desire a quick transition.100 Yet, there lies 
importance in a natural transition as opposed to a forced, rapid move 
from an ending to a new beginning. 
The neutral zone in the transition model represents that time 
spent between the ending and the new beginning.101 Bridges refutes 
the idea that it should be likened to the act of crossing a street.102 
The realization that the neutral zone serves a purpose rather than an 
obstacle, a tool rather than a nuisance, is at the core of the transition 
model.103 
Individuals, while desirous of change, usually believe the neu- 
tral zone is more of a nuisance and an obstacle.104 Bridges notes, 
“[p]eople often ask whether there isn’t some way to speed up tran- 
sition, to get it over sooner; when they do, they are usually thinking 
of the time in the neutral zone when very little seems to be happen- 
ing.”105 However, the neutral zone affords individuals the ability to 
fully divest from the past, and “as does any unfolding natural pro- 
cess, the neutral zone takes its own sweet time.”106 More concern- 
ing, arbitrary acts of speeding up the neutral zone process can have 
the reverse effect. “Far from bringing you out the neutral zone 
sooner, such tactics usually set you back and force you to start over 
again.”107 As a word of warning, Bridges concludes, “[f]rustrating 
though it is, the best advice is to opt for the turtle and forget the 
hare.”108 
The neutral zone allows for insight and germination of new 
ideas.109 It is a necessary element in change and will undoubtedly 
occur after any loss or ending; the speed at which it occurs may also 
be uncontrollable. Bridges is speaking on an individual level of how 
people transition from one stage to the next. This may appear to be 
 
100   Id. at 143. 
101   Id. at 141. 
102 Id. at 133-34. 
103 Id. at 133. 
104   Id. 
105 BRIDGES, supra note 97, at 143. 
106   Id. 
107   Id. 
108   Id. 
109 Id. at 174. 
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a microelement in the discussion of a macro topic such as humani- 
tarian intervention, but if it does, then the realization that when deal- 
ing with humanitarian intervention we are dealing with individual 
human beings has been lost. That is a key connection between the 
transition model and humanitarian intervention, and in turn, P4D, 
that we are dealing with people and the changes wrought upon them, 
regardless if that change was demanded. 
The transition model is another tool outside of the legal realm 
that may be used to consider the importance of P4D in humanitarian 
intervention. Change movement consultant, Sean E. Reynolds (Vet- 
eran U.S. Navy), acknowledged the similarities about destabilizing 
organizational change and the resulting destabilization often seen 
after the abrupt removal of authority structures on the international 
stage as noted in the authors’ earlier works.110 As Reynolds notes, 
concerning the relationship between change management on an in- 
dividual level and to that of an international level: 
Understanding that groups and organizations behave 
like organisms we can understand that cultures be- 
have and interact with one another like organisms ir- 
respective of borders. In the context of International 
Relations, change management is the deliberate me- 
thodical management of controlling specific out- 
comes through the transitions one or more culture, or 
nation, faces as a result of intervention.111 
Libya and Kosovo again serve as good examples of how 
Bridges’s warning about taking a step back can play out if a transi- 
tion is forced to speed up. During the period that Libya was in the 
midst of a revolution—the Arab Spring—U.S. and NATO opera- 
tions in the region sped the transition along by assisting the revolu- 
tion under the umbrella of humanitarian intervention.112 The death 
of Gaddafi brought an end to the U.S. and NATO operations.113 As 
 
110 E-mail from Sean E. Reynolds, LSSMBB, MBA, CPM, to Richard A.C. 
Alton, Esq. (Apr. 11, 2019) (on file with author). 
111 E-mail from Sean E. Reynolds, LSSMBB, MBA, CPPM, to Richard A.C. 
Alton, Esq. (June 3, 2019) (on file with author). 
112 Alan J. Kuperman, A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing 
NATO’s Libya Campaign, 38 INT’L SECURITY 105, 135-36 (2013). 
113 Alton & Struble, supra note 3, at 35. 
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opposed to ushering in a jubilant time of renewal and a stronger 
Libya, the country fell into the grips of a civil war that has lasted for 
more than half a decade.114 Likewise, NATO operations in Kosovo 
effectively ended any possibility of any joint proceedings between 
Kosovo and Serbia,115 leaving Kosovo’s declaration of independ- 
ence the only option, and thus dashing any hope for natural healing 
between the two nations. These findings evince that while forced 
intervention may speed along a transition the effects can be detri- 
mental. 
Additionally, Bridges’s comment on its best to let the neutral 
zone play out in its time116 rings the same of Coady’s conclusion 
that while less glamorous, rooting out the fundamental causes that 
lead to humanitarian intervention may serve the best in the long 
term, if not the short term.117 Taken in connection with the warnings 
supplied by Kuperman, we begin to build a comprehensive frame- 
work for the need of pushing P4D to the fore. Rapidly forcing 
change, even welcome change, during a transitional time such as a 
revolution can have a destabilizing turn on a population. That un- 
derstanding is key to P4D. 
 
V. PRE-EXISTING THRESHOLDS: R2P & RWP 
P4D is not the only standalone threshold criterion or principle 
when it comes to humanitarian intervention. R2P and RWP are two 
other well-recognized principles.118 By comparing and contrasting 
P4D to treaty-based criteria R2P and RWP, we strengthen the case 





114 Frederic Wehrey, ‘Our Hearts Are Dead.’ After 9 Years of Civil War, Lib- 
yans Are Tired of Being Pawns in a Geopolitical Game of Chess, TIME (Feb. 12, 
2020), https://time.com/5779348/war-libya-global-conflict/. 
115 Ved P. Nanda, NATO’s Armed Intervention in Kosovo and International 
Law, 10 U.S.A.F. ACAD. OF LEGAL STUD. 5-6 (2000). 
116 BRIDGES, supra note 97, at 143. 
117 See C.A.J. Coady, supra note 66, at 36. 
118 Kai M. Kenkel, Brazil and the Responsibility While Protecting Initiative, 
OXFORD RSCH. GRP. (June 9, 2016), https://www.oxfor- 
dresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/brazil-and-the-responsibility-while-protecting-initia- 
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A. The Creation And Degradation Of R2P 
In the wake of Kosovo, the International Commission on Inter- 
vention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) presented a report titled The 
Responsibility to Protect.119 The R2P doctrine consists of two main 
criteria.120 First, “State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the 
primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the 
state itself.”121 Second, “Where a population is suffering serious 
harm . . . and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or 
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
responsibility to protect.”122 
These principles were later adopted by the U.N. and manifested 
themselves as follows: 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect 
its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This respon- 
sibility entails the prevention of such crimes, includ- 
ing their incitement, through appropriate and neces- 
sary means. We accept that responsibility and will 
act in accordance with it. The international commu- 
nity should, as appropriate, encourage and help 
States to exercise this responsibility and support the 
United Nations in establishing an early warning ca- 
pability. 
The international community, through the United 
Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, 
in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Char- 
ter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against human- 
ity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
 
119 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1 (2001), http://responsibilitytopro- 
tect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
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including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate 
and national authorities are manifestly failing to pro- 
tect their populations.123 
However, even with the advent of R2P, the authors found the 
notion that as soon as crimes against humanity are committed that 
the international community should step in to be simplistic and 
vague.124 Also, there still exists the possibility for action outside of 
the purview of U.N. statutes.125 The possibility for action outside of 
the U.N. statutes is also bounded in the reality of inaction on the part 
of the U.N. Security Council, because of either lack of political will 
or outright lack of cooperation.126 R2P stood as the guiding light for 
humanitarian intervention until it was questioned and criticized. 
 
B. No One Heeds The Call For Reform: RWP 
RWP was born in late 2011, during U.N. Security Council de- 
liberations concerning the advancing Syrian civil war and in the 
larger discussion of R2P and the U.N. Security Council’s role.127 It 
was during this time that the U.N. Permanent Representative of Bra- 
zil, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, presented to the U.N. Secretary- 
General a concept note, entitled Responsibility while protecting: El- 
ements for the development and promotion of a concept.128 The con- 
cept note addressed “the ‘painful consequences’ of past interven- 
tions—aggravation of existing conflicts, increased incidence both of 
terrorism and vulnerability of civilian populations, and new cycles 
of violence—and a ‘growing perception’ that R2P might be misused 
for         purposes         such         as         regime         change.”129 
 
123   G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138-39 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
124 Alton & Struble supra note 3, at 21. 
125 See generally Bethlehem, supra note 53. 
126    Ved P. Nanda, The Future under International Law of the Responsibility 
to Protect after Libya and Syria, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L. REV. 1, 42 (2013). 
127 See id. at 21-22. 
128   Id. at 31 (citing U.N. Permanent Rep. of Brazil, Annex to the Letter dated 
9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Na- 
tions addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/551-S/2011/701 (Nov. 
11, 2011)). 
129 Id. at 32 (quoting U.N. Permanent Rep. of Brazil, Annex to the Letter dated 
9 November 2011 from 
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RWP was not seen as a means of supplanting R2P with a 
new theorem, but as a means of checking R2P’s original intent with 
proper mechanisms and assurances.130 “The Brazilian proposal sug- 
gested the establishment of what could be described as a ‘code of 
conduct’ for the practical operationalization of R2P, particularly in 
its coercive dimensions.”131 As true to its name, RWP sought to put 
the burden of some of the responsibility of the results of intervention 
on the international intervenors, not solely on the internal actors. 
Force is to be used, per RWP, only under the guidance of the U.N. 
Security Council or in exceptional circumstances approved by the 
U.N. General Assembly.132 Force must be proportionate, not exceed 
its U.N. mandate, nor cause more harm than it sought to prevent.133 
Among the legacy of RWP is that “[i]t attracted a wider range of 
participants to the discussion by emphasizing not only the moral is- 
sues associated with enforcing R2P, but also other problems with 
the collective security system, such as authority and accountabil- 
ity.”134 
The word legacy is important, as RWP never fully materialized 
into specific proposals.135 It did leave its mark on discussions of 
R2P.136 However, its connectedness to R2P and the U.N. Security 
Council led to its inability to function outside of it. As Nanda appro- 
priately concluded, “the reality that without political will and coop- 
eration among the permanent members of the Security Council no 
action is possible at the United Nations.”137 With an inability to 
 
 
the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/551-S/201 1/701, ¶¶ 9-10 (Nov. 11, 2011)) 
(sharing an earlier acknowledgment of NATO being used as the military arm of 
the U.N. in Libya). 
130 See Marcos Tourinho, Oliver Stuenkel & Sarah Brockmeier, “Responsibil- 
ity while Protecting”: Reforming R2P Implementation, 30 GLOBAL SOCIETY 134, 
140 (2016); see also Nanda, supra note 126, at 32. 
131 Tourinho, et.al., supra note 130, at 141. 
132 Nanda, supra note 126, at 32. 
133 Id. 
134 Tourinho, et.al., supra note 130, at 141. 
135 Id. at 149. 
136 Id. (“Brazil’s initiative successfully articulated the need for responsible 
means of protection, particularly when military force is used in the name of col- 
lective security and humanitarianism.”) 
137 Nanda, supra note 126, at 42. 
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cooperate among the permanent members, R2P has lost some ap- 
peal, regardless of whatever RWP sought to add. 
 
VI. P4D AS A STANDALONE THRESHOLD CRITERION 
With sabers rattling over potential military intervention in Latin 
America, the authors believe it is time to present P4D as a standalone 
threshold criterion. The vacuum left by R2P needs to be filled by a 
forward-thinking criterion like P4D. Because most recent military 
actions have had their focus on removing central governments and 
their authority structures, the international community requires a cri- 
terion that directly acknowledges the practical over the theoretical. 
So why push P4D beyond Nanda’s criteria and beyond R2P and 
RWP? As for P4D’s primary position before Nanda’s criteria and 
those like it, the issue was presented that if all the criteria except 
P4D were met then a humanitarian intervention might be justified.138 
This, however, would prove disastrous for entire regions, unleashing 
the potential to throw not just one country, but dozens to the brink 
of civil war and chaos. The concern is that international actors would 
feel legally justified because they had satisfied all other criteria. As 
such, P4D was pushed to the foreground to avoid this potential issue. 
As for preceding R2P and RWP, P4D recognizes the ability of hu- 
manitarian interventions outside of the inflexible U.N.139 and P4D 
acknowledges the deterioration of R2P as the marquee threshold of 
humanitarian intervention.140 
The very nature of, and the calculations required by, P4D de- 
mand that it be the first consideration. The elevation of P4D to that 
of a threshold criterion is necessary and appropriate because it 
frames the most likely outcome of military action by States taken to 
protect populations from gross human rights abuses. The calcula- 
tions required by P4D—those used to examine whether global or 
regional destabilization might occur from failure to exhaust all non- 
military actions and the potential of removing central governments 
and other authority structures—need to be made before international 
actors begin to look at necessity, proportionality, purpose, nature of 
the actors, and maximization of the best outcomes of any single 
 
138 See generally Alton & Struble, supra note 3. 
139   Id. 
140   Id. 
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intervention. P4D requires States to examine the potential for desta- 
bilizing regions and countries before discussing whether a certain 
crisis fulfills any of the other criteria for justifying military interven- 
tion. 
Procedurally, P4D was developed with two central elements: (1) 
the international community must be satisfied that it has exhausted 
all plausible nonmilitary actions before taking collective military ac- 
tion, and (2) the international community must take into account the 
quantifiable result of removing the central government before taking 
collective military action.141 P4D now requires international actors 
to examine the potential for destabilizing regions and countries be- 
fore engaging in a discussion of whether or not the facts satisfy any 
other criteria for involvement. Before taking collective military ac- 
tion in the name of humanitarian intervention, the international com- 
munity should determine the most likely outcome of abruptly re- 
moving central governments.142 This is because of the reality that 
“[i]n the absence of a central government, practical procedural safe- 
guards cannot be put in place to protect civilians from internal 
threats.”143 As a standalone threshold, P4D must be applied to cur- 
rent suggested humanitarian interventions. 
 
VII. P4D APPLIED TO CURRENT POTENTIAL HUMANITARIAN 
CRISES 
“[T]he only positive way forward for Venezuela is through a ne- 
gotiated, democratic and peaceful solution stemming from free and 
fair presidential elections in accordance with international 
norms.”144 These are the words taken from a speech by Ambassador 
James Roscoe, U.K. Acting Deputy Permanent Representative to the 




141 Id. at 34. 
142 Id. at 33-36. 
143 Id. at 35. 
144 Ambassador James Roscoe, U.K. Acting Deputy Permanent Representa- 
tive to the UN, Statement at the Security Council Briefing on Venezuela: Moving 
Venezuela toward a Democratic Future (May 20, 2020) (transcript of the speech 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/moving-venezuela-to- 
ward-a-democratic-future). 
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response to a failed coup called Operation Gideon,145 which has 
come to be described as “the dumbest damn coup plot” in Latin 
American History.146 This particular coup does not appear to be in 
response to the federal indictments against Nicolás Maduro and 
other Venezuelans, which came with an award of $55 million U.S. 
Dollars; but the coup no doubt brought it to the forefront.147 What if 
the coup had succeeded, or what if it comes to pass that there is suf- 
ficient pressure to cause a military intervention in Venezuela, Nica- 
ragua, Cuba, or Syria? We may only need to look to Libya for an- 
swers. 
A similar fate may be waiting for Latin America if any military 
action in Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Cuba occurs or another coup suc- 
ceeds. In discussing the current state of affairs in October 2019, the 
Washington Post noted, “[t]he crises, while different from country 
to country, have some common threads. The economy in much of 
Latin America has slowed. Democratic institutions remain weak. 
The public is far less tolerant of corruption and poor services. And 
polarization is rising.”148 As the Post finds, “[a]ll of this makes for 
flammable situations.”149 This was all before a global lockdown to 
stop the spread of COVID-19, so it is conceivable that the situation 
has turned from bad to worse. 
Libya presented a sufficient model to apply P4D.150 In 2014, the 
authors determined that the U.S. and NATO Libyan operations 
failed to satisfy P4D’s two elements, because the goal was to oust 
Gaddafi and the international community failed to consider a proper 
 
145 Matthew Walther, Did We Just Witness One of the Nuttiest Foreign Policy 
Blunders in American History?, THE WEEK (May 7, 2020), https://www.ya- 
hoo.com/news/did-just-witness-one-nuttiest-095759283.html. 
146 Jeremy Kryt, Trump Just Inspired the Dumbest Damned Coup Plot in 
LatAm History, Complete with a QAnon Crazy, THE DAILY BEAST (May 7, 2020), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/in-venezuela-trump-just-inspired-the-dumbest- 
coup-plot-in-latin-american-history-complete-with-a-qanon-crazy. 
147 Joshua Goodman & Scott Smith, US indicts Venezuela’s Maduro on nar- 
coterrorism charges, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 26, 2020), https://ap- 
news.com/d82797206561db03851e47df125c243f. 
148 Mary Beth Sheridan, Why political turmoil is erupting across Latin Amer- 
ica, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 2019, 5:41 PM), https://www.washing- 
tonpost.com/world/the_americas/why-political-turmoil-is-erupting-across-latin- 
america/2019/10/10/a459cc96-eab9-11e9-a329-7378fbfa1b63_story.html. 
149   Id. 
150 See generally Alton & Struble, supra note 3. 
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transition for Libya before removing him.151 In doing so an entire 
region was destabilized; a similar fate awaits Latin Americans if we 
are foolish enough to go down the same path twice. 
The potential for a similar Arab Spring scenario playing out in 
Venezuela and Latin America is compelling. As of this writing, the 
Venezuela opposition has already attempted an unsuccessful 
coup.152 The opposition has intimated at the possibility of asking for 
foreign intervention, specifically from the U.S.153 How the repercus- 
sions of this would be felt if international actors were to answer this 
call is intriguing, especially in similarly situated countries like Nic- 
aragua. If domestic actors believe their calls for international help 
will be answered, it may only serve to galvanize revolutions which 
otherwise would have been internal struggles. 
A humanitarian intervention involves an act of violence as much 
as any other act of violence, regardless of its name. The authors, 
living in a state (Florida) that has a large number of people with 
family and friends who are being harmed, tortured, or have been 
killed in countries such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, cannot 
ignore that there is the unfortunate balancing act about stopping 
these harms or causing an unfettered amount of more death. It is the 
perceived, or even hopeful, benefits of avoiding sitting on the side- 
line while watching a humanitarian crisis unfold that elevates it to a 
moral high ground. But, in doing so we cannot ignore the contradic- 
tion of stopping violence with violence and the repercussions that 
follow from it. 
It is not hard to see the potential for destabilization spreading to 
countries such as Ecuador, Peru, Honduras, and Haiti, which were 
all in the beginning stages of turmoil before the COVID-19 pan- 
demic.154 No situation is the same, but when stressors already exist 
in a region, the full-blown immediate destruction of the central gov- 
ernment and other authority structures in one country as a result of 
military intervention may spill over into another, causing an entire 
region to slip into turmoil, which may, in turn, lead to additional 
cases of gross human rights abuses. 
 
 
151 Id. at 34, 36. 
152 Venezuela crisis, supra note 7. 
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If the authors were to apply P4D’s central elements—(1) the in- 
ternational community must be satisfied that it has exhausted all 
plausible nonmilitary actions, and (2) the international community 
must take into account the quantifiable result of removing the central 
government and other authority structures before taking collective 
military action—to the current situation, the conclusion would be 
clear. While there is no doubt the legitimacy of human rights viola- 
tions occurring in countries such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and 
Cuba, P4D would be a stopgap measure to any full-blown interven- 
tion. As James Roscoe notes,155 the only plausible way forward is 




The time is now for P4D to assume the mantel left by the degra- 
dation of past criteria such as R2P and RWP. P4D has moved be- 
yond multifaceted and multi-layered criteria such as Nanda’s, be- 
cause the authors recognize the true goal of most current forms of 
intervention heralded as humanitarian intervention. Human rights 
violations are occurring across the globe, but intervention is meant 
to stop violence, not to add to it. 
Altruistic humanitarian intervention is still needed in today’s 
world, but questions of its lack of proper utilization can be raised in 
such overlooked past crises, such as Rwanda, or current ones, such 
as Myanmar. In practice, most forms of current humanitarian inter- 
vention are or have become moves for regime change. The threat of 
its use in Latin America is beyond concerning. Lives have been de- 
stroyed under such interventions, and worse, done so without appro- 
priate forethought. Practically, we as a society must be cognizant 
that today’s revolutions are televised and tweeted about; thus, jurists 
would be hard-pressed to ignore the reliance on international assis- 
tance by victimized groups in sovereign nations to end their plights. 
Extra caution must be used to prevent an entire continent from being 
pushed to the brink of war. 
P4D is not meant to diminish those subjected to tyrannical re- 
gimes. Rather, it is meant as a call to responsible parties: before we 
unleash the dragons of war upon a population, we need to think 
 
155 Roscoe, supra note 144. 
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about what that will mean not just tomorrow, but the next day and a 
thousand days after that. These are dark times; there is no denying 
that. But we can no longer dabble in war in the name of humanitar- 
ian intervention. And if there is no appetite in the international com- 
munity to fully subjugate a nation that has committed gross human 
rights violations to ensure the least amount of destabilization, our 
current form of humanitarian intervention seems to only cause fur- 
ther harm. 
